My research examines external support for democratization and state-building in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
Leonie Reicheneder, Michael Neureiter
Democratization 2024
Democracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.
Leonie Reicheneder, Michael Neureiter
Democratization 2024
Democracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.
Leonie Reicheneder, Magnus Lundgren
Democracy aid is increasingly given to countries with a history of war and political violence, however with limited success. To increase the aid’s efficacy in supporting democratization, democracy assistance must align with local needs and preferences, yet we lack knowledge about which types of foreign and democracy aid citizens in these settings prefer. This project investigates recipient public attitudes towards democracy aid in four post-conflict countries: Armenia, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Using conjoint survey experiments with 6,000 respondents, we will identify which donors, aid types and delivery channels publics in post-conflict states prefer. The findings will offer guidance on how to design democracy aid in a way that aligns with local preferences and supports the aid’s efficacy in promoting democratization in post-conflict states.
Leonie Reicheneder, Magnus Lundgren
Democracy aid is increasingly given to countries with a history of war and political violence, however with limited success. To increase the aid’s efficacy in supporting democratization, democracy assistance must align with local needs and preferences, yet we lack knowledge about which types of foreign and democracy aid citizens in these settings prefer. This project investigates recipient public attitudes towards democracy aid in four post-conflict countries: Armenia, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Using conjoint survey experiments with 6,000 respondents, we will identify which donors, aid types and delivery channels publics in post-conflict states prefer. The findings will offer guidance on how to design democracy aid in a way that aligns with local preferences and supports the aid’s efficacy in promoting democratization in post-conflict states.
Anna Persson, Leonie Reicheneder
In an era of democratic backsliding, democracy aid is increasingly turned to as a key instrument for promoting democracy and democratization. Yet in a time when democracy aid already amounts to over ten billion dollars a year worldwide, there is still substantial variation in observed effects across societies. To increase our understanding of the sources of this variation, building on the literature on the sequencing debate, this paper investigates the role of state capacity in channeling the effects of democracy aid. More specifically, we develop and test the argument that state capacity, understood in coercive and administrative terms, affects the incentives and opportunities of both elites and citizens to implement and use democracy aid for the purpose of democratization. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis, covering the period from 2002 until today, and investigate the way in which different dimensions of state capacity influence the impact of democracy aid.
Anna Persson, Leonie Reicheneder
In an era of democratic backsliding, democracy aid is increasingly turned to as a key instrument for promoting democracy and democratization. Yet in a time when democracy aid already amounts to over ten billion dollars a year worldwide, there is still substantial variation in observed effects across societies. To increase our understanding of the sources of this variation, building on the literature on the sequencing debate, this paper investigates the role of state capacity in channeling the effects of democracy aid. More specifically, we develop and test the argument that state capacity, understood in coercive and administrative terms, affects the incentives and opportunities of both elites and citizens to implement and use democracy aid for the purpose of democratization. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis, covering the period from 2002 until today, and investigate the way in which different dimensions of state capacity influence the impact of democracy aid.
Leonie Reicheneder
Democracy aid is often disbursed to countries recovering from civil war to promote transitions to democracy and bottom-up democracy aid – assistance targeted at strengthening and democratizing civil society – is prioritized in post-conflict settings. Despite negative expectations about democracy aid effectiveness, there is variation in the aid’s success in post-conflict countries. What explains these differences in the degree to which aid promotes democracy remains unclear. I argue that the way in which the preceding civil war was terminated affects the recipient elites’ incentives to implement bottom-up democracy aid. Democratization reforms create three main costs for non-democratic incumbents: a loss of political power, uncertainty about their future political power, and decreased access to state rents. Aid only incentivizes democratic reforms when the risks of not democratizing outweigh these costs for the incumbent. I expect the impact of bottom-up democracy aid on democratization to vary with three conflict outcomes - peace agreements, ceasefires and decisive victories – as these determine the balance of power between the incumbent and civil society in a post-conflict setting. The more equal this balance, as is the case after negotiated peace agreements, the more credible the threat of revolution from civil society that pushes for democratic reforms. This in turn raises the risks of not democratizing for the incumbent and incentives the implementation of bottom-up democracy aid to appease civil society. I test the argument by analyzing the effect of bottom-up democracy aid on democracy levels for all post-conflict countries between 1947 and 2013. The results reveal that conflict outcomes play an important role in shaping the impact of bottom-up democracy aid to post-conflict countries. Such aid is more effective in settings where civil wars are terminated through peace agreements and less effective after decisive victories by one side. The findings contribute to our understanding of why the effectiveness of democracy aid varies across post-conflict contexts.
Leonie Reicheneder
Democracy aid is often disbursed to countries recovering from civil war to promote transitions to democracy and bottom-up democracy aid – assistance targeted at strengthening and democratizing civil society – is prioritized in post-conflict settings. Despite negative expectations about democracy aid effectiveness, there is variation in the aid’s success in post-conflict countries. What explains these differences in the degree to which aid promotes democracy remains unclear. I argue that the way in which the preceding civil war was terminated affects the recipient elites’ incentives to implement bottom-up democracy aid. Democratization reforms create three main costs for non-democratic incumbents: a loss of political power, uncertainty about their future political power, and decreased access to state rents. Aid only incentivizes democratic reforms when the risks of not democratizing outweigh these costs for the incumbent. I expect the impact of bottom-up democracy aid on democratization to vary with three conflict outcomes - peace agreements, ceasefires and decisive victories – as these determine the balance of power between the incumbent and civil society in a post-conflict setting. The more equal this balance, as is the case after negotiated peace agreements, the more credible the threat of revolution from civil society that pushes for democratic reforms. This in turn raises the risks of not democratizing for the incumbent and incentives the implementation of bottom-up democracy aid to appease civil society. I test the argument by analyzing the effect of bottom-up democracy aid on democracy levels for all post-conflict countries between 1947 and 2013. The results reveal that conflict outcomes play an important role in shaping the impact of bottom-up democracy aid to post-conflict countries. Such aid is more effective in settings where civil wars are terminated through peace agreements and less effective after decisive victories by one side. The findings contribute to our understanding of why the effectiveness of democracy aid varies across post-conflict contexts.